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Considering Morale as the Tenth Principle of War

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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| 15. Abstract: For the operational planners, one of the most important aspects is the consideration and planning surrounding the principles of war. The principles of war are so important, that failing to accommodate them normally leads to failure. Historically, morale too demonstrates incredible impact of the outcome of war. The degree morale impacts victory is such that it warrants consideration for inclusion as a principle, of war. To compare morale's adequacy as a principle of war, a litmus test is developed. The litmus test consists of some common characteristics of the principles of war, as well as its purpose. The common characteristics of the principles of war studied include their impact on war, the applicability across all levels of war, and their enduring qualities. The purpose of the principles is developed and coupled with the characteristics to form the litmus test. Morale is then compared against these factors, and found wanting. Though morale shares commonality with characteristics of the principles, it does not share a common purpose, thus it is not recommended for inclusion as a principle of war. However, another point to consider is the inherent cognizance of successful leaders to continue to take care of their troops, that perhaps that is why is not required on the list of principles of war. The literature review clearly points out that the U.S. senior leaders have sufficiently fostered and supported the morale of their troops, it will not be relegated to any status that could be forgotten. | | | |
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Introduction

Many books, articles and papers document the positive effect of morale on combat power and the efficiency of troops. Military historians have described the battles in which morale carried the day lauding its contribution to success. Lord Moran sums it up quite nicely in Anatomy of Courage, "It is not the number of soldiers, but their will to win which decides battles."¹ Morale is clearly *important*, but how *important*, to the outcome of war?

The outcome of war is dependent upon different aspects of warfare. From the planning perspective, a commander's consideration of the *Principles of War* (or, simply the principles) is required for success, clearly making the principles *very important* aspects of warfare. If taken into consideration during the planning and execution phases, the principles will result in victory on the battlefield. Failure to account for them results in failure on the battlefield.²

Since both the principles and morale represent aspects *important* to the outcome of war, should morale be included as a principle of war? What litmus test, if any, adequately defines the principles in order to compare morale? Before answering the question "Should morale be included in the principles of war?" a framework for comparison is useful. Defining morale and the principles of war, and analyzing characteristics common to each provides one such framework for comparison.

Background

What is Morale?

Morale is inherent in the fighting spirit of every Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine. Morale possesses unequalled motivational influence. John Baynes, in Morale, A Study of Men and Courage, writes morale " ... is seen as an individual's readiness to accept his fate willingly even to the point of death..."³ He further elaborates on morale's effect on the troops' determination.

High morale is the most important quality of a soldier. It is a quality of mind and spirit, which combines courage, self-discipline, and endurance. It springs from infinitely varying and sometimes contradictory sources, but is easily recognizable ... In time of war, it manifests itself in the soldier's absolute determination to do his duty to the best of his ability in any circumstances.⁴

This determination to get the job done, regardless of the cost, is one reason morale is so important to the troop and his unit.

Webster's defines morale as "The mental and emotional attitudes of an individual to the function or tasks expected of him by his group and loyalty to it. A sense of common purpose with respect to a group: *esprit de corps*."⁵ John Baynes further adds morale is " ... concerned with the way in which people react to the conditions of their existence. It is usually applied to those aspects of life, which are difficult and dangerous, and often has military undertones."⁶ Russell Glenn's article "No More Principles of War" quotes George C. Marshall's description of morale, to include:

"... Steadfastness, courage, hopes. It is confidence, zeal and loyalty. It is elan, esprit de corps, and determination ... the spirit which endures to the end ... the will to win. With it, all things are possible, without it, everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught."⁷

A literary review of morale, descriptions of its impact on the outcome of battle, and morale's causal factors begin to coalesce into a common theme. This emerging theme results in the following working definition for morale:

Morale is the intangible characteristic of the warfighter that embodies the determined will to fight. It draws its strength from confidence in oneself, one's equipment, one's unit, and one's leadership. It possesses an innate belief in the unit, its cohesion, and its purpose (mission). Moreover, it maintains loyalty to the honorable completion of the mission, recognizing the requisite self-sacrifice.

Defining the principles of war and listing their common characteristics allows for comparison. This comparison serves as the basic litmus test to evaluate morale's 'qualifications' for inclusion as a principle of war. First, a definition of the principles is helpful.

What are the Principles of War?

Russell Glenn's "No More Principles of War" provides a concise yet detailed history of the principles. After reviewing numerous battles, campaigns, and wars, historians and military theoreticians developed a list of tenets, or maxims, common to victory in battle. This list became the principles of war.⁸ The principles are pervasive throughout U.S. military doctrine, most notably listed and *defined* in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.⁹

The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant. The principles of war currently adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.¹⁰

The defining *purpose* of the principles of war is to provide a framework, an interwoven, comprehensive list of things to contemplate when planning for combat. However, there is an important point with respect to this purpose, alluded to by Carl Von Clausewitz and other military historians and theorists. The principles of war *do not* define a standalone checklist for success. Rather, the principles require careful consideration of their affects in the context of the other principles, and the time, space and forces of the battle. The synergism achieved when coupling the principles with each other must aim to accomplish the desired objective(s). The principles provide a tool to assist the commander from forgetting a planning aspect so important, that omission leads to catastrophic failure.

Having defined and described morale, as well as defining and stating the purpose of the principles, it appears morale is similar enough to consider further examination. A review of common characteristics of the principles provides more insight, and lays the foundation for comparison.

Analysis

Common Characteristics of the Principles

Research indicates commonality inherent in the principles of war. This commonality includes: the impact of the principles on warfare; their applicability across all levels of warfare; their universal relevance across time and space; and a common purpose to preclude failure in battle due to omission of critical aspects. Examples, or statements, supporting the commonality of the principles follow. Expanding each of the common aspects provides the desired litmus test for direct comparing morale with the principles.

Impact on Warfare

A common characteristic of the principles of war is their influence on the battlefield. Proper usage and consideration of the principles by a commander in battle consistently results in victory. If morale is to be considered as a principle of war, then morale too should influence combat positively leading to victory.

The Principles' Impact on Warfare

Carl Von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini, and Napoleon Bonaparte *generally* agree there is a *list* of essential elements for victory.¹¹ The search by these men, as well as other military historians, theoreticians, and academicians, has resulted in a historical distillation of factors common to victorious battles. Collectively, though not all agree which items make up this *list* of principles, they agree a *list* of principles does exist that satisfies the definition above (essential

requirements for victory).¹² Historically, those commanders who exploited the principles share in the majority of victories, while those who did not plan, or consider, their use shared in the majority of defeats.

The record shows that winners, by and large, took heed of the principles. The losers, discounting those who were overcome by sheer weight of manpower and material, by and large, did not.¹³

The principles of war share this common feature of victory in battle. The initial selection process ensured this: historically selecting various battles and identifying common facets of the victories led to the current list of principles. Essentially, this is a self-fulfilling definition, though the commonality among the principles remains. While the general premise of historians and military theoreticians is this list of principles is important to success in battle, is it the only list? Are there other facets or aspects of warfare that significantly contribute to victory? Specifically, does morale's impact in battle historically compare favorably with the principles' impact on battle?

Morale's Impact on Warfare

Thomas Vaughn, in "Morale: The Tenth Principle of War," successfully demonstrates the historical importance of morale in warfare, from a *macro* view. He ably argues that morale should be elevated and included as one of the most important aspects of the art of combat, one of the principles of war. His 1983 essay, drawn from numerous historical perspectives, highlights the intrinsic and irreplaceable value morale brings to the battlefield, and its resulting positive effects on the outcome of warfare.

In contrast to the *macro* view of Thomas Vaughn's analysis of many battles spread out over centuries, is the *micro* view of John Baynes' analysis of a single unit during a series of engagements. John Baynes, the British author whose father fought in the 'Great War', outlines numerous reasons for the high morale in a British unit--the 2nd Scottish Rifles in WWI. In Morale, A Study of Men and Courage, he highlights different battles, passionately describing the factors contributing to, and the positive results from, high morale. "The maintenance of morale is recognized in military circles as the most important single factor in war: outside these circles, there is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so."¹⁴ Taken a step further, he concludes.

Tactics are relatively less important than most other aspects of war.... The truth is that a brilliant plan of battle in a tactical sense can be a complete failure if morale is bad, while a poor plan can be made to work well if morale is good. The more academic one's approach, the greater one's divorce from this truth.¹⁵

Though perhaps taken to the extreme, his point deserves valid consideration: unless one has lived through combat and seen first hand morale's impact on in combat, it is difficult to truly appreciate its importance.

When describing the factors in victory in WWII, Richard Overly claims morale was one of the five decisive elements in the Allies' ultimate victory.¹⁶ He points out that both the Axis and the Allies saw morale as critical to their efforts. When invading Russia, German leaders "... favored an attack at the center of the front, to

seize the Soviet capital, Moscow. This was where the bulk of Soviet forces were concentrated; the loss of the city would be devastating for Soviet morale."¹⁷ The German leaders were right, to a point. From the Russian perspective, the morale was getting quite dire, not just the morale of the troops in combat, but the people as well. Stalin decided this required immediate action, the result was the historic order number 227.

At the height of this crisis of morale came the historic order 'No. 227', from Stalin himself; the Red Army was to stand firm against the invader.... It was not mere fear ... that kept the Soviet people fighting in 1942. There was widespread and spontaneous patriotic revival, and a wave of revulsion against German brutality.¹⁸

This was one of many efforts Stalin initiated to improve morale, but the desired rise in Russian morale was dreadfully slow.¹⁹ However, once Russian morale began to improve, interestingly enough, German morale started slipping, significantly. "When the Russians started their counter-attack, the morale of German forces slumped as the tempo of battle increased."²⁰ As morale declined, German soldiers began to surrender, in increasing numbers, due to circumstances of utter hopelessness and panic. German leadership realized the situation was dire.²¹ The peaking morale of the Russians was clearly dominating the waning morale of the Germans.

Additionally, on Germany's Western Front, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to attack the morale of the Germans by bombardment of the German populace. The bombardment was the only successful point Churchill made when trying to convince

Stalin to join the alliance. When he explained the de-moralizing effect the allies were trying to achieve, Stalin finally agreed.²²

Morale's influence on war is considerable. Another example of morale's influence is how it affects the 'friction', or 'fog' of war. Peter Paret, in his treatise on Carl Von Clausewitz' On War, defines friction. "Friction refers to uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, and to their effect on decisions, morale and actions."²³ Peter Paret decides "...the morale, spirit and self-confidence of the army is a weapon against the friction of war."²⁴ Implicitly, it follows that reducing 'fog' or 'friction' improves conditions. Improved conditions, at a minimum, favorably influence the battle, potentially decidedly so, resulting in victory.

The historical views presented by these authors demonstrate morale's influence on warfare. Thomas Vaughn presents a broad, though shallow, view at a *macro* level in his review of many battles separated by time and place. Richard Overly's analysis is more in-depth, more operationally focused, view examining various battles of the German invasion into Russia. Finally, John Baynes provides a *micro* view, narrowly focused, in-depth analysis of a single force limited over time and space. Peter Paret specifically addresses morale's direct impact on certain aspects of war, clearing the 'fog' or 'friction' of war.

Influencing battle to the point of resulting in victory is a feature common to both the principles of war and morale. The previous examples demonstrate history

is replete with examples of morale's impact on war, and the resulting victories. Both the current principles and morale share the common characteristic of influencing warfare to result in victory.

Levels of War

Another characteristic common to the principles of war is their applicability across various levels of war. Thus, if morale is to be considered as a principle of war, then morale too should influence combat across all the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Principles and the Levels of War

Applicable at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, the principles have contributed significantly to the outcomes of battles, campaigns or wars. Joint doctrine confirms "... the principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels."²⁵ For instance, the strategic level includes a clear objective, the element of maneuver, and unity of command. These principles, though manifested differently, are also present at the operational and tactical levels of war.

Morale and the Levels of War

Vaughn quite capably describes the aspects of four types of morale: *individual*, *unit*, *army*, and *national*. He does not explicitly state the four types correlate to specific levels of war, though his framework provides for direct correlation. The effects of each type of morale present themselves at corresponding levels of war. *Unit*, and to a degree *individual*, morale manifest themselves at the tactical level (unit cohesion and *esprit*); *army* morale at the operational level (as the sum of its individual parts); and *national* morale to the strategic level (national consensus).²⁶

Vaughn, Overy, and Baynes demonstrate in their analyses that morale is applicable across all levels of war. Vaughn's broad view coincides with the strategic level (many battles separated by time and place). Overy's more in-depth view focuses on the operational level (the German invasion into Russia). As well as Baynes' narrower, but most in-depth analysis (a single force limited over time and space) provides an example at the tactical level.

Both morale and the principles share important and defining characteristics. Both have played decisive roles in winning wars throughout history, and they continue to apply across all levels of war. Is this sufficient to consider placing morale on the list of principles? Perhaps there is some universal truth or enduring quality of the principles that proves decisive.

Universal Truth and Change

The labeling of the principles with certain qualities posed by the writers of joint doctrine demonstrate another common feature among the principles. If morale is to be included in the principles, a comparison to determine whether or not it shares the qualities is in order.

Principles, Universal Truth and Change

Since 1949, the principles of war have remained the same. No changes in the principles for the last 50 years imply that they are here to stay. The Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 reinforces this perception (emphasis added).

The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are *universally true and relevant*.²⁷

They [the principles] are the *enduring bedrock* of U.S. military doctrine.²⁸

What makes the principles *universally true and relevant*? What qualifies them as *enduring bedrock*? The phrase *universally true and relevant* is ascribed to the principles by virtue of the process through which the list was created. Analysis of historical battles resulted in the current list of the principles. Support of this concept of universal truth comes from, if not derived by, the military theorist Antoine Jomini. He wrote (emphasis added) "There have existed in all times fundamental principles on which depend good results in warfare ... these principles are *unchanging, independent of the kinds of weapons, of historical time and of place*."²⁹ However, to surmise that just because they *have* always been true means that they *will* always be true is short sighted.

Universally true and relevant imply the principles apply, and are germane, to everyone *regardless of time and place* (nation, space), that the principles apply to all troops of all times. However, a review of the principles of other countries (*places*) reveals differences in both the numbers of principles and the principles themselves.

Historians and military theorists of other countries recognize the principles' impact on combat. An examination of only a handful of nations (see Appendix A) highlights over fifteen different principles of war, vice the nine listed in U.S. doctrine. Interestingly, of the six principles not found in the U.S. list, morale stands out as one of the most common. For instance, the U.S. principle of 'Simplicity' is not a principle for Great Britain, Australia, People's Republic of China (PRC), Israel, or France. However, 'Morale' is a principle for Great Britain, Australia, PRC, and Israel, though not for the United States.³⁰ These countries, in examining their history and warfare, have determined the usefulness of morale is of sufficient importance that they include it as a principle of war. Zvi Lanir, in his article "The 'Principles of War' and Military Thinking" succinctly describes the historical reasons some countries have different principles. He states, essentially, some principles are simply not relevant to a particular country, whereas other principles are quite relevant.³¹ For example, China, with its vast population, considers 'National Mobilization', whereas France, influenced by the 1870 Prussian defeat, considers 'Liberty of Action' a principle of war.³²

If the principles are not universally true across the nations, are they universally true across the spectrum of time, as '*enduring bedrock*' implies? A review of the principles' roughly 80-year history reveals there have been changes, though only minor.³³ The author is more inclined to agree with RADM C. R. Brown, in his 1949 Honorable Mention U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, which considers the principles "... interesting and helpful." However, he goes on to say "... these principles are not sacred nor are they immutable."³⁴ The principles have undergone minor changes over time, remaining essentially constant since 1921. Thus, though they have changed slightly, they have remained almost unchanged.

The principles have changed very little over time, remaining almost the same. However, the principles are not universally true across the nations. An analysis comparing morale with these standards follows. *Universally true and relevant* applies to time, but not places.

Morale, Universal Truth and Changes

Morale too, has essentially remained the same over time, yet changed over place. The definition has remained constant over time, yet the effect of morale on combat is different for different nations. Through the years, minor changes in aspects of morale occurred, pointed out by John Baynes in 1967.

One can, perhaps, say morale is an unchanging quality, and that the ways of sustaining it are in principle unchanging as well, but that where the change comes is in the methods of applying these principles. As men get more used to comfort, more sophisticated,³⁵ and more intelligent, it becomes essential to take more trouble over their morale.

Some countries consider morale more important than others do, as described previously. Therefore, both the principles of war and morale have remained essentially the same over time, yet they change over the dimension of place.

However, it is important to highlighting a subtle difference between the principles and morale, between gaining victory and preventing defeat. Although historical examples exist where the loss of the battle was attributed to the commander's failure to consider the principles, this was not found to hold true for morale. In researching different battles and wars from the early 1500's through Desert Storm/Desert Shield, the author found not a single instance where poor morale was the reason a battle was lost. Although failing to plan for the principles resulted in defeat in most instances, no instances were found where the lack of planning for morale, or low morale, resulted in defeat. Both morale and the principles are aids to victory, yet only the principles prevent defeat. Thus, both the principles of war and morale are credited with influencing victories, yet only the principles of war are credited with being the cause of failure (when the commander failed to plan for them).

Does Morale Qualify as a Principle of War?

Examples previously mentioned demonstrate morale played an important role, perhaps the key role, in many victories throughout history. Additionally, morale,

like the principles, applies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Both morale and the principles have essentially remained the same over time, yet change significantly across space, being more applicable or relevant in some countries than others have. However, morale differs from the stated purpose of the principles of war. The purpose of the principles is to remind the commander of the requisite critical aspects of war, to ensure the aspects receive thorough planning, and that failing to plan results in losing the war. Given morale shares common characteristics with, though not the purpose of, the principles of war, should it be included?

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

Does morale compare favorably as a principle of war? Morale shares common characteristics with the principles. Both the principles and morale influence war, often leading to victory. The principles and morale apply across all levels of warfare, strategic, operational, and tactical. Additionally, they each have essentially remained constant over time, though they change across space (nations). However, is the commonality morale holds with the principles sufficient to add morale to the list of principles?

"The plan can be bad, the conditions appalling, and the task hopeless: a good battalion will make something of it."³⁶

Morale, though extremely important to the outcome of victorious battles, shares these common characteristics with the principles, but that is not sufficient. *It does not share a common purpose with the principles of war.* The *purpose* of the principles of war is to provide a framework, an interwoven, comprehensive list of things to contemplate when planning for combat. Inherently implicit is that without conscientious, painstakingly detailed, critical analysis and planning for the principles, a commander risks losing the war (it is not required the commander maximize the use of all principles, just that he consider them).³⁷ The principles provide a tool to assist the commander from forgetting a planning aspect so important, that omission leads to catastrophic failure.

The litmus test is to review the principles' purpose and common features, then compare these features with morale. This comparison determines morale's qualification for inclusion in the list of principles. However, given the purpose of the principles, morale does not satisfy this quality of a principle of war. The author found not a single instance of a battle, campaign, or war where the loss was due to a lack of high morale, or failing to plan for morale. Conversely, the omission of, or failure to plan for, a principle of war most likely led to a loss, at some level (battle, campaign or war). Documentation consistently supports morale receiving laudatory praise for decisively influencing victory, but not being the reason for the loss. Thus, if the lack of morale did not result in loss, then it does not meet the criteria required to become a principle of war.

Recommendations

The review of books, papers and articles surrounding morale clearly points out a common aspect requiring mentioning. This aspect is that high morale in a unit is a direct result of good leadership. Authors General Paul Blackwell and Major Greg Bozek offer, "Command from a helicopter gives better communications and usually better visibility and control, but does not normally outweigh the morale aspects of sharing ground troops' hazards under fire."³⁸ Attributing morale to leadership is not unique to the military perspective alone. Congressman Ike Skelton, discussing retention in the military in his August 1999 article "Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion" states (emphasis added).

Morale is the mental and emotional condition of an individual or group in terms of enthusiasm, confidence, and loyalty. *Morale is a subjective end state directly attributable to leadership and its manifestations, such as a leaders' genuine concern for the welfare of the troops.* Among esprit, morale and cohesion, morale is the most volatile.³⁹

"It is morale that wins the victory."⁴⁰ Military and civilian leaders recognize morale as important to the fighting power of combat troops. "A leader's duty is to strengthen the morale factors while mitigating the impact of the environment."⁴¹ Every commander of troops must strive to reach the highest level of troop morale. It is the responsibility of the leader of personnel, a responsibility of command.⁴² During WWII, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, George S. Patton each recognized morale as a function of leadership.⁴³ It remains inherently present in U.S. military leadership, considered continuously, both consciously and subconsciously. Baynes, in 1967, alluded to the fact that the

requirements for maintaining morale would increase. A review of articles on leadership revealed the "care and feeding" of troops is something the U.S. expends incredible energy trying to accomplish.⁴⁴

The point is that morale is an aspect of the warfighting unit so prevalent in U.S. forces that it must be fostered and nurtured to ensure it is maintained at the highest levels. The literature review clearly supports morale is so intrinsically inherent in the successful commander, too thoroughly ingrained in quality leadership to be forgotten or ignored. This aspect of warfighting is so important and in the forefront of the commander's thought processes, that it *could not* be omitted. Thus, there is no need to codify it in a list of critical reminders.

Senior U.S. commanders and leaders must continue to train their subordinates (future leaders) to continually strive to foster and improve the morale of troops under their charge. Thus, morale will remain ever present, driving the warfighter to "... absolute determination to do his duty to the best of his ability in any circumstances."⁴⁵

Notes

¹ Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London, England: Constable, 1945), 16, 81.

² The Author is not privy to the list of battles, campaigns, and wars examined to determine the principles. However, it is reasonable to assume that without them, defeats would ensue, and with them, victories surely resulted.

³ John Baynes, Morale, A Study of Men and Courage (London, England: Cassell & Company, LTD., 1967), 108.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G & C Merriam Company, 1963), 550.

⁶ Baynes, 92.

⁷ Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War," Parameters, Spring 1998, 10.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The principles of war are discussed to some length in each of the following service and joint publications: Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Joint Pub 1); Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Joint Pub 3-0); Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia; Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army; Army FM 100-5, Operations; Naval Warfare (Naval Doctrine Publication 1); Air Force Basic Doctrine (Air Force Doctrine Document 1); and Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon.

¹⁰ In addition to those references listed in note 9 above, Russell W. Glenn's, "No More Principles of War," Parameters, Spring 1998, and RADM C. R. Brown's "The Principles of War", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1949 also contain informative descriptions and insight. A summary of the principles is contained in Appendix B of this paper. However, the reader without an in-depth understanding of these principles will not get the full meaning or appreciation for the principles without further study. Additionally, Appendix B contains service specific highlights or changes to each of the principles. These extracted highlights are from the different service's individual doctrines.

¹¹ Bernard Brodie states "Although Clausewitz himself speaks loosely of certain principles to be observed and followed..." in War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p.446. In his book The Foundations of the Science of War, J.F.C. Fuller quotes Napoleon having said "If one day I can find the time, I will write a book in which I describe the principles of war in so precise a manner that they will be at the disposal of all soldiers, so that war can be learnt as easily as science." J. D. Hittle's The Art of War -- Jomini, quotes Jomini as stating "the fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of war have always existed."

¹² Naval War College handout NWC 1057, "The Worth of Principles of War", from a lecture delivered by Professor Bernard Brodie on March 7, 1957 to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 1.

¹³ John C. Collins, "The Principles of War," Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984), 3-9.

¹⁴ Baynes, 92.

¹⁵ Ibid., 93.

¹⁶ Richard J. Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), p. i.

¹⁷ To a large degree, they were right. The battle was not going well for Stalin. He recognized the ill effects of the German invasion on the morale on his people. This recognition led to quick action to rectify the situation. This action was intended to instill pride in the Soldier, the Motherland, and served to rally the 'morally righteous' cry throughout Russia. Ibid., 64.

¹⁸ Ibid., 69.

¹⁹ Medals and braid would not defeat the German armies. They were part of a fundamental effort ... to restore a sense of self-confidence, and the means for effective resistance. Ibid.

²⁰ "The terrible weather and the delays it caused, the mismanagement of the forces, the distances required to traverse and sustain lines of logistics were wearing on the Germans." Ibid., 75.

²¹ "By late December, his [Paulus] soldiers were beyond rescue ... the conditions they [250,00 troops] experienced were destructive of strength and will. There were desperate shortages of food, the endless bombardments, the collapse of medical services for the wounded and sick, and the grim, unbearable realization that there was no way out. Wilhelm Hoffman, a German infantryman who arrived in his unit in Stalingrad in early September, wrote his last diary entry on December 26: 'The horses have already been eaten. I would eat a cat, they say the meat is also tasty. The soldiers look like corpses or lunatics, looking for something to put in their mouths. They no longer take cover from Russian shells; they haven't the strength to walk, run away and hide.'" Ibid., 82-83.

²² On January 21, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the air forces to bring about the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Though the bombing campaign was not as successful in disabling the morale of the German populace as desired, they saw morale essential to the German fight, requiring continued efforts to destroy it. This description of the bombing campaign by Churchill to Stalin was the turning point in reaching an alliance. Churchill was making no ground in reaching an agreement until Churchill promised [to Stalin] a ruthless bombardment to shatter the morale of the German people. Ibid., 102, 110, 117.

²³ Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 202.

²⁴ Ibid., 199.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" (Joint Pub 3-0), 1 February 1995, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

²⁶ Thomas Vaughn, "Morale: The Tenth Principle of War?," Military Review, May 1983, 24-29.

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States" (Joint Pub 1), 10 January 1995, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia," 16 July 1997, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

²⁹ J. D. Hittle, The Art of War -- Jomini, (Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press), 1947, 8.

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Staff Officer's Guide," n.d. Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

³¹ Zvi Lanir, "The 'Principles of War' and Military Thinking," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1993, 2-3.

³² Ibid.

³³ Introduced to U.S. doctrine in 1921, the codified list was contained in U.S. Army Training Regulation No. 10-5, Doctrine, Principles, and Methods. With only minor changes from 1921 until 1949 (see table below), they have existed in U.S. doctrine in their current state for fifty years.

The Evolution of the Principles of War

| <i>Training Reg. 10-5, Doctrine, Principles and Methods, 1921</i> | <i>Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations FM 100-5, 1939</i> General Principles | <i>Field Service Regulations, Operations FM 100-5, 1941. Doctrines of combat</i> | <i>FM 100-5, Field Service Regulation, Operations, 1949</i> | <i>FM 100-5, Operations, 1993</i> |
|--|--|--|---|---|
| Economy of Effort Mass Movement Objective Offensive Security Simplicity Surprise Cooperation | Concentration of superior forces Ultimate objective Offensive action Security Simple and direct plans Surprise Unity of effort | Concentration of superior forces Ultimate objective Offensive action Security Simple and direct plans/methods Surprise Unity of effort | Economy of Effort Mass Maneuver Objective Offensive Security Simplicity Surprise Unity of Command | Economy of Effort Mass Maneuver Objective Offensive Security Simplicity Surprise Unity of Command |

The Principles of War in the 1939 and 1941 publications received different titles, noted in bold font. Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War", Parameters, Spring, 1998.

³⁴ C. R. Brown, "The Principles of War", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1949, 621.

³⁵ Baynes, 107.

³⁶ Ibid., 94.

³⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz' view on the purpose of the principles described them as similar to a map, providing information, options, and feasible directions, but not necessarily deciding for the commander where the battle should be taken (emphasis added). Even these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a *frame of reference* for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take.

³⁸ Paul E. Blackwell and Gregory J. Bozek, "Leadership for the New Millennium," Military Review, June 1998, 5.

³⁹ Ike Skelton, "Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion", Military Review, August 1999, 2.

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, Quotes for the Military Writer, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 1974, 2-3.

⁴¹ John M. Spiszer, "Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task", Military Review, June 1999, 3.

⁴² Joint Pub 1-02 states command includes "...the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel." 104.

⁴³ Vaughn, 28.

⁴⁴ Reviewing the 1998 and 1999 issues of *Military Review* reveals leadership is a topic of frequent writings. In the articles are numerous mentions of morale, its characteristics, and importance. Specifically, Steven Eden, "Leadership on Future Fields: Remembering the Human Factor in War," June 1999; Nola M. Sleeve, "Applying the Principle of War," June 1998; Ike Skelton, "Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion," August 1999; John M. Spiszer, "Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task," Paul E. Blackwell and Gregory J. Bozek, "Leadership for the New Millennium," June 1998; Attila J. Bognar, "Tales from Twelve O'clock High: Leadership Lessons for the 21st Century," February 1998; and Thomas W. Britt "Responsibility, Commitment and Morale", February 1998.

⁴⁵ Baynes, 108.

Appendix A

Principles of War¹

| UNITED STATES | GREAT BRITAIN and AUSTRALIA | FORMER SOVIET UNION "Principles of Military Art" | FRANCE | PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA |
|----------------------|--|--|-------------------------|---|
| Objective | Selection & Maintenance of Aim | | | Selection & Maintenance of Aim |
| Offensive | Offensive Action | | | Offensive Action |
| Mass | Concentration of Force | Massing & Correlation of Forces | Concentration of Effort | Concentration of Force |
| Economy of Force | Economy of Force | Economy, Sufficiency of Force | | |
| Maneuver | Flexibility | Initiative | | Initiative & Flexibility |
| Unity of Command | Cooperation | | | Coordination |
| Security | Security | | | Security |
| Surprise | Surprise | Surprise | Surprise | Surprise |
| Simplicity | | | | |
| | Maintenance of Morale | Mobility & Tempo, Simultaneous Attack on All Levels, Preservation of Combat Effectiveness, Interworking & Coordination | Liberty of Action | Morale, Mobility, Political Mobilization, Freedom of Action |

| UNITED STATES | ISRAEL² | FINLAND³ | POLAND |
|----------------------|--|--|-----------------------------|
| Objective | Objective | Aim and Clearness of Mission | Objective |
| Offensive | Initiative and Offensive | Exploitation of Circumstances | Initiative |
| Mass | Concentration of Efforts | Mass | |
| Economy of Force | Depth & Reserve | Economy of Forces | Economy of Force |
| Maneuver | | Activity to Seize the Initiative from the Enemy | Maneuver |
| Unity of Command | | | |
| Security | Security | | |
| Surprise | | Surprise | Surprise |
| Simplicity | | Simplicity and Clearness | |
| | Morale, Administration, Exhaustion of Forces, Strategem, Continuation & Perpetuation | Determination, Correct assessment all forces, Utilize success (high OPTEMPO), Bold decisions, Flexibility in plans and options, Exploit enemy's weaknesses | Sustainability, Flexibility |

¹ U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, "The Joint Staff Officer's Guide." n.d., Figure 1-1, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

² Zvi Lanir, "The 'Principles of War' and Military Thinking", Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1993, 3.

³ Jukka Pennala, Finlandian Navy, in memorandum to Capt. John DuGene, Fall 1999.

Appendix B

Principles of War with Service Specific Additions/Changes

Economy of Force. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Navy Doctrine modifies this definition to include "*Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible.*"¹ Air Force doctrine qualifies this principle further by adding, "... by selecting the best mix of combat power."²

Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Air Force Doctrine adds, "... that contributes to strategic, operational, or tactical aims."³

Offensive. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Air Force adds, "... [offensive] provides the means for joint forces to dictate battle space operations."⁴

Security. The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage. Navy Doctrine adds, "Protecting the forces increases our combat power."⁵ At face value, the addition by the Navy of protecting forces increases combat power does not hold. Security *prevents* attrition of power, but it does not *increase* it. Implicitly however, the morale boost of the forces serving under a commander who is providing *security*, is an intangible, yet clear, increase of combat power. Air Force doctrine explicitly adds that security applies not just to the forces, but their operations.⁶

Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Navy and Air Force doctrine modify this definition. "Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations."⁷ Both Navy and Air Force doctrine avoid the more passive phrase "to ensure understanding", yet add the more active phrase "... and conducting military operations." The intent by the two services for this modification is unknown.

Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

Unity of Command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

¹ Chief of Naval Operations, "Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare," 28 March 1994, 46, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

² Ryan, Michael E, "Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document 1," September 1997, 18, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1999.

³ Ibid., 13.

⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁵ Chief of Naval Operations, 47.

⁶ Ryan, 18.

⁷ Chief of Naval Operations, 52, and Ryan, 21.

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